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Abstract 
Standard banking theory suggests that there exists an optimal level of credit risk that yields 
maximum bank profit. We identify the optimal level of risk-weighted assets that maximizes 
banks’ returns in the full sample of US banks over the period 1996–2011. We find that this 
optimal level is cyclical for the average bank, being higher than the realized credit risk in 
relatively stable periods with high profit opportunities for banks but quickly decreasing below 
the realized in periods of turmoil. We place this cyclicality into the nexus between bank risk 
and monetary policy. We show that a contractionary monetary policy in stable periods, where 
the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized credit risk, increases the gap between them. 
An increase in this gap also comes as a result of an expansionary monetary policy in bad 
economic periods, where the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk.     
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1. Introduction 
Bank managers make risky decisions about the transformation of liabilities to assets so as to 
produce profits. However, they can also produce large losses if they take on too much risk or 
if structural and macroeconomic conditions change unexpectedly.
1
 This implies that the risk–
return relationship is nonlinear and that there should be an optimal level of credit risk. 
Further, the inherent maturity mismatch between the asset and liability sides of the bank 
balance sheet causes a problem of time inconsistency: banks might alter their optimal risk 
decisions in different times. Despite the fundamental role of this idea in any theoretical model 
of bank risk and default, the empirical literature has largely neglected distinguishing between 
the realized and optimal (equilibrium) credit risk for the average bank and over time. Thus, 
the important implications of this distinction for the monetary and macroeconomic 
environment have not been studied. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature. 
 Theoretical models of the banking firm operating under adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and/or incomplete contracting assume that banks choose between risky and less risky 
assets and manage liabilities to maximize their value or profits (e.g., John, Saunders, and 
Senbet, 2000; Agur and Demertzis, 2012). Thus, banks make optimal decisions in light of the 
variable microeconomic problems they face, mostly related to informational asymmetry, and 
the regulatory and macroeconomic conditions. In this framework, equilibrium bank behavior 
can be compared and endogenized with optimality conditions for other agents (e.g., 
consumers or regulators) to study more general equilibrium relationships.  
In practice, however, the realized level of credit risk is not equal to the optimal one in 
the short term. There can be many interrelated reasons for this discrepancy and three of them 
seem to be the most important ones. First, banks, like any other firm, can simply be 
inefficient and operate below capacity. In this sense, banks may fail to choose the optimal 
                                                          
1
 In a recent paper Agur and Demertzis (2012) model a bank manager’s investment decision as a choice between 
two projects, one of which has lower expected return and higher volatility than the other.   
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mix or level of risky assets, a situation exacerbated during periods of rising uncertainty (e.g., 
Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 1993). Second, the banking sector is notoriously 
characterized by herding behavior, which is usually pegged to the choices of leading banks or 
to the changing perceptions about the regulatory and macroeconomic environment. The 
history of banking crises has shown that herding behavior can be an important element in 
suboptimal risk decisions of banks in both good and bad economic periods (e.g., Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007). Third, and perhaps most important, the maturity mismatch between 
assets and liabilities that is inherent in the banking business implies that the quality of bank 
balance sheets can quickly deteriorate in light of adverse developments due to depositor 
behavior in a classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, credit rationing á la Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), and other well-established mechanisms. Thus, banks can find themselves 
in situations where in good times they take on less than the optimal credit risk, while in bad 
times they are exposed to higher than the optimal risk. The outcome of both these states is 
lower than optimal returns.                
We identify deviations between the realized and optimal bank credit risk using a 
simple empirical setup. We assume that bank profits depend on the risk decisions of bank 
managers and bank managers want to maximize returns on assets (or returns on equity if 
there is no principal agent problem). To do so, they seek the optimal level of credit risk. If 
bank managers decide to take on too little credit risk and hold a large share of liquid assets in 
their portfolios, bank profits will not be maximized. Bank returns will also be sub-optimal if 
bank managers take on too much credit risk, leading for example to the accumulation of a 
high volume of nonperforming loans (e.g., Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2004). Thus, 
profit as a function of risk may be described better by an inverted U-shaped curve.  
Another important element of this setup is that the level of optimal credit risk must be 
time-varying. For instance, consider the situation in the period 2001–2007. Perceptions about 
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the stability of the banking system were really optimistic and credit risk decisions were 
paying high yields. This implies that the optimal bank credit risk is relatively high during 
prosperous periods. When the housing bubble burst, banks found themselves exposed to very 
risky positions that started yielding losses because of the surging nonperforming loans. 
Furthermore, bank managers could not adjust the level of credit risk in the very short term, 
mainly because of issues related to maturity mismatch. Thus, in periods of stress, the optimal 
credit risk should be lower than the actual credit risk held in the portfolio of the average bank.  
Using quarterly panel data for virtually all banks that operated in the United States 
(US) during the period 1996–2011, we identify the time-varying optimal level of credit risk 
mainly in terms of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. We indeed find a cyclical 
movement of the optimal level of credit risk for the average bank, which peaks just before the 
eruption of the crisis in 2006. The optimal credit risk quickly deteriorates from 2007 onward 
and this leaves banks with a higher than optimal credit risk in the crisis period. This explicitly 
shows how the deviations between the realized and optimal credit risk, owing to the three 
main channels highlighted above, leave the average bank operating in a suboptimal way.  
These deviations have interesting implications for the monetary and the 
macroeconomic environment. A recent literature examines the interplay between banks’ risk, 
monetary policy, and macroeconomic outcomes, suggesting that a monetary expansion leads 
banks to take on higher risks (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro, 2014; Delis, Hasan, and 
Mylonidis, 2011). Our analysis is not about identifying the potency of this mechanism, which 
is termed the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Instead, we opt for identifying a relation 
between the macroeconomic and monetary conditions, and the deviations between the 
optimal and the realized actual risk in bank portfolios. To this end, we use a vector error 
correction model (VECM) and time-series data on the federal funds rate and the median risk-
weighted assets of US banks. We show that the optimal monetary policy from a 
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macroeconomic viewpoint increases the deviations between the realized and optimal credit of 
banks, thus pushing banks to a suboptimal disequilibrium situation. In line with our result, 
Agur and Demertzis (2013) use a relevant theoretical model and show that because bank risk 
is sticky, monetary policy should keep rate cuts short to prevent excessive risk buildup. 
Specifically, in good economic periods, the Fed has incentives to increase the interest 
rates. In these periods, where the optimal level of banks’ credit risk is higher than the realized 
risk, we show that a monetary contraction will not only decrease the realized credit risk (in 
line with the existence of a risk-taking channel) but also increase the optimal level of credit 
risk. Similarly, in periods of turmoil in the banking sector, where the optimal level of banks’ 
credit risk is lower than the realized risk, we show that a monetary expansion will increase 
the realized credit risk and decrease the optimal level of credit risk. Therefore, in both good 
and bad periods, the “optimal” monetary policy choices by the Fed aiming at smoothing the 
business cycle, force the realized level of banks’ credit risk out of equilibrium. We contend 
that this finding has important policy implications for both the conduct of monetary policy 
and the prudential regulation of banks.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model 
used to estimate the optimal level of credit risk on the basis of specific theoretical 
considerations. Section 3 discusses the data set and the estimation method. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results from the estimation of the optimal credit risk. Section 5 examines the 
macroeconomic relations between the optimal level of credit risk, the realized credit risk, and 
the monetary conditions.  Section 6 concludes the paper.     
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2. Identification of the optimal credit risk 
2.1. Profitability equation and risky assets 
Most theoretical studies model the banking firm as a wealth- or profit-maximizing entity. The 
premise is that banks use a set of inputs to invest in risky assets with a high return and in less 
risky assets with a low return (e.g., John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000). The bank is also 
required to hold a fair amount of reserves with the central bank, as well as capital to absorb 
losses. Thus, the basic banking model can consider the presence of reserve requirements, 
capital regulation, or other forms of intervention. The bank decides on the optimal allocation 
of resources of high- and low-risk assets given its budget constraint and the “safe and sound” 
banking constraint posed by the regulator (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988). One can also 
think that the bank has its own soundness constraint if its decision is to maximize wealth or 
profits subject to minimizing the probability of default. This relates to the notion of the 
market discipline of the banking firm (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).    
Hughes and Mester (1994; 1998) provide an influential empirical counterpart of this 
theoretical framework. The first of these studies tests whether bank managers are acting in 
the shareholders’ interest and maximizing expected profits or a utility function that trades off 
risk for return. The findings rule in favor of the trade-off between profit and risk. The second 
study shows that in a similar model of the banking firm, banks of different size classes 
exhibit behavior consistent with risk aversion.  
This basic modeling of the banking firm yields a profit equation of the form (or 
similar to): 
𝛱 = 𝑝1𝑦1 + 𝑝2𝑦2 + 𝑝3𝑦3 − 𝐶(∑ 𝑦
3
𝑛=1 , 𝑤) − 𝑝𝑘𝐾 (1) 
In this profit function, y1 is the quantity of the risky asset (credit risk), which earns an average 
interest rate p1. The interest rate on the risk-free asset y2 is p2 and p3y3 is the revenue from 
other sources not directly related with credit risk. We can consider that y1 + y2 represents the 
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total assets of bank i used to generate profits, while 3 3p y  represents the noninterest income. 
Bank outputs are produced using input prices w and the bank draws capital K (at some rate 
pk), which can be of the form of equity capital or debt-based capital.  
 
2.2. Empirical model and the distinction between the short- and the long-run  
In the empirical banking literature (e.g., Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2010), the identification of 
the factors explaining profits comes from a specification where the returns on assets or equity 
are regressed on a number of bank characteristics including those of equation (1). As profits 
are normalized with respect to the total assets or equity, it is usual practice to normalize the 
rest of the bank characteristics, including the variable used as a measure of credit risk y. 
Further, John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000), among others, assume that the representative 
bank maximizes expected profits by deciding on the optimal mix of risky and riskless assets, 
while standard microeconomic theory suggests that the profit function will be concave in y1 if 
the cost function is convex (Hughes and Mester, 1994).   
 These considerations point to a non-linear relationship between profits and credit risk. 
The intuition of such an empirical modelling choice comes from quadratic objective functions 
in portfolio management that first appeared in Markowitz (1959). In our paper, the 
assumption on the non-linear relation between credit risk and profits is mostly based on the 
fact that banks must take credit risks to maximize their profits, but taking too much credit risk 
might result in losses. Empirical equations with squared terms are commonly used to describe 
maximization problems in the literature (e.g., Dell’ Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez, 2014, for a 
recent example). Simplicity facilitates our aim, which is to estimate a risk-return relationship 
in terms of portfolio management and not to provide a general equilibrium model for bank 
profits. The latter would require taking into account the price setting behavior of a bank as a 
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competitive firm and the informational problems that exist between borrowers and lenders; 
such a model is significantly more complicated and beyond the scope of this paper. 
To identify the global maximum point, where the marginal impact of credit risk (i.e., 
the risky assets) turns negative, we estimate the following profit equation: 
 𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,     (2) 
where Π is the return on assets (or equity) of bank i at time t; r ≡ y1 denotes credit risk, c is a 
vector of control variables observed at the bank level that include, inter alia, the risk-free 
asset; and u is the disturbance. Here uit can be analyzed as 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,         (3) 
where λt denotes time fixed effects, vi denotes bank fixed effects, and eit is the remainder 
disturbance. The presence of the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables 
is in line with the evidence that bank profits persist (Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson, 
2011). From equation (2), we identify the level of r that maximizes Π by setting the partial 
derivative of Π with respect to r equal to zero, i.e.,  
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑟
= 0 => 𝑟 = −
𝑎1
2𝑎2
.        (4) 
 Equation (2) also implies an unconstrained maximization problem for the managers. 
A major factor which is against this assumption is bank regulation. Regulation may either 
reduce (ceteris-paribus) the desired risk by a requirement in capital, i.e. the Basel Accord 
requires banks to hold capital of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets, or may increase the risk 
taken by providing implicit protection to “systemic” or “too-big-to-fail” banks (Kaufman, 
2014). However, regulation constraints are time invariant and individual specific, i.e. the 
capital constraints apply ever since the first Basel Accord and very few banks show a 
dramatic change in status, thus are captured by the bank fixed effects 𝑣𝑖.  
 Also, bank herding behaviour, which may come from information contagion, can be 
described by cross section dependence and is captured by λt which is common across banks. 
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In this way, bank limited liability is also captured given its correlation with herding 
behaviour (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). 
An important distinction should be made here between the short- and the long-run 
objectives of the bank. Even though the distinction is somewhat blurry, most theoretical work 
on the objectives of the banking firm assumes a financial soundness constraint in place that 
implies long-term value maximization (e.g., Valencia, 2011). However, the majority of this 
work includes models that are static and have a short-term horizon based on expected profits, 
reflecting the idea of informational asymmetries due to agency problems (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). For example, because of information asymmetries between bank managers 
and owners or investors, the bank value can be driven by short-term results on profits, thus 
providing incentives to the bank managers to focus on these results at the expense of the 
long-term value-related targets of the bank.
2
  
 In line with the short-term profit-maximization literature, in our study we focus on the 
estimation of the optimal short-run bank credit risk. Thus, we do not provide any implications 
on the long-run equilibrium credit risk (where markets would clear) that maximizes value 
given a financial wealth constraint. We just provide inference on the potential short-run 
disequilibrium credit risk that bank managers would take to maximize short-term profits.        
 
3. Data and estimation method 
3.1. Data 
We obtain bank-level quarterly data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Call reports. We start with the full sample of US commercial banks for the period 1996Q1 to 
2011Q4, but we drop a number of observations where the values of our main variables are 
                                                          
2
 Clearly, short-term profit maximization does not necessarily increase shareholder value in the long run, a result 
that is well-documented also in the banking literature (Livne, Markarian, and Mironov, 2013, and Davies et al., 
2014).  However, studies like Keeley (1990) and Matutes and Vives (1996) suggest that in fairly competitive 
banking systems, such as the US one after the liberalization process in the late 1980s, the tradeoff between 
short- and long-term profit behavior favors the former.  
10 
 
quite unreasonable (e.g., negative values of bank assets). The reason our sample starts in 
1996 is that data on risk-weighted assets, our main measure of risky assets, are unavailable 
before this date. Our final sample consists of 574,532 observations. Table 1 provides formal 
definitions for the variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 reports summary 
statistics. 
[Insert Tables 1&2 about here] 
 We measure bank profits using the return on assets and equity in alternative 
specifications. While deciding on the risk strategy of banks, most bank managers consider the 
return on assets as the most important measure of bank profits (e.g., Hughes and Mester, 
1994). In turn, a high return on equity is the primary objective of bank shareholders. Given 
that we are primarily interested in risk decisions, which are made by bank managers, we use 
the return on assets as our main dependent variable and provide sensitivity analysis on the 
basis of the return on equity.  
Concerning the measures of high- and low-risk assets, we follow the regulatory 
definition of risky and riskless assets from the FDIC (2012). In particular, we use the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets (named risk-weighted assets) as our main proxy for the 
risky decisions of bank managers. In calculating this ratio different weights are assigned to 
different types of bank assets under the guidelines of the Basel Accord (e.g., Basel, 2011) 
and, thus, this ratio also encompasses information on the risk of the mix of different types of 
assets as in most theoretical banking models (e.g., John, Suanders, and Senbet, 2000). 
Further, risk-weighted assets measures ex ante as opposed to ex post risk of banks and this is 
the main reason it is favored by bank regulators and used in our empirical analysis. 
Specifically, our theoretical propositions on the optimal level of risk refer to ex ante bank 
risk, i.e. the risk position that bank managers obtain in a speculative manner to maximize 
profits. Naturally, at this time bank managers do not know the realized level of risk ex post.  
11 
 
The Basel accord also explains why using a risk-weight approach is the preferred 
methodology for the calculation of the risk position of banks. First, this ratio provides an 
easier approach to compare the riskiness of banks within and across countries; second, off-
balance-sheet exposures can be easily included in capital adequacy calculations; and third 
banks are not deterred from carrying low risk liquid assets in their books. One could further 
differentiate between the various risky assets to obtain a more complex picture of the risk 
decisions of bank managers. For example, we may consider separate categories of loans 
bearing different risk weights under Basel II (e.g. Barakova and Pavlia, 2014). However, the 
purpose of this study is to identify the optimal bank risk for the average bank in terms of total 
credit risk and not to provide a complex analysis of the shares of various risky assets in bank 
portfolios.  
The risk-weighted assets ratio is, however, criticized by a recent strand of literature on 
the basis of manipulation by banks or minimal sensitivity to market risk (e.g., Mariathasan 
and Merrouche, 2014; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Acharya, Engle, and Pierret, 2014). 
To this end, we examine the sensitivity of our findings by using the ratio of 30-89 days 
delinquent loans to total loans (delinquent loans) as an alternative ex ante measure of credit 
risk. This measure has the advantage that is not subject to over-manipulation by banks. 
However, this measure does not reflect the entire gamut of the credit risk activities by banks 
and might be less useful in its forecasting ability if delinquencies are the result of systemic 
risk hitting the banking industry and not the idiosyncratic behavior of each bank (i.e., 
delinquencies start to rise simultaneously with the systemic problems of the whole banking 
sector).
3
 Further, delinquencies arrive after the “risk-taking” decision of bank managers to 
maximize profits: if managers new that the loans would fall into this category, the profit-
maximization principle would imply the avoidance of the specific loan contracts.  
                                                          
3
 See e.g. Delis, Hasan, and Tsionas (2014). 
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To control for the riskless assets in bank portfolios we use the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets (liquidity). Further, to avoid associating ex ante bank risk with risk arising ex post, 
we also control for the level of problem loans and loan-loss provisions (see Table 1 for 
explicit definitions). The inclusion of the problem-loans variable (named problem loans) 
suggests that bank managers make risk decisions today while knowing the level of problem 
loans in their portfolios. Similar to problem loans, the provisions variable (named provisions) 
does not capture the level of risk-taking per se, but it relates to managers’ expectations about 
future losses in case of adverse developments (e.g. Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012). Given that 
these expectations may or may not be realized, provisions represents another aspect of credit 
risk reflecting the level of bank managers’ risk aversion. Thus, we assume that problem 
loans, provisions, and risk-weighted assets should be simultaneously included in our model, 
while we confirm in sensitivity analysis that exclusion of the former two variables does not 
yield significantly different results. Table 3.1 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients 
between the variables used in our empirical analysis for the full sample (the one using risk-
weighted assets) and Table 3.2 the equivalent ones for the sample including delinquent loans. 
Evidently, the correlation coefficients between all the risk-related variables are quite small. 
[Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here] 
 For the empirical estimation of equation (2), we use a number of additional bank-level 
control variables. In particular, we control for (i) bank size using the natural logarithm of real 
total assets (deflated by the GDP deflator), (ii) bank capital using the ratio of equity capital to 
the total assets (and/or the ratio of the risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets), and (iii) 
other sources of bank income using the ratio of the noninterest income to total income. The 
use of bank size and capital allow controlling for the profits arising from economies of scale 
and imperfections in capital markets, respectively. The noninterest income variable captures 
profits generated from nontraditional bank activities and is controlled for to prevent the risk-
13 
 
weighted assets variable from capturing the impact of these activities on bank profits (e.g. 
Karim, Liadze, Barrell, and Davis, 2013). All these are in line with the discussion of equation 
(2).
4
  
An important feature of the data from the Call reports is that many of the variables 
display high seasonality. This is mostly the case with bank profits. Within each year, the 
lowest profits are observed on average in quarter 1 and the highest profits are observed in 
quarter 4. A similar pattern is observed to a different degree with many other of our bank-
level variables. To avoid introducing a bias in our results because of the differences in the 
level of seasonality between the dependent and explanatory variables, we seasonally adjust 
the data. Specifically, we estimate equations of the form 
  𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐷2 + 𝑏2𝐷3 + 𝑏3𝐷4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (5) 
where xit is one of Πit, rit, cit and D2, D3, D4 are equal to 1 in quarters 2, 3, and 4, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. The estimation method for equation (5) is OLS on the fixed effects 
model. Then, we calculate the seasonally adjusted variables as  
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝜀?̂?𝑡.          (6) 
In some of the estimated equations, where we do not use time effects as in equation 
(3), we include a number of variables common to all banks that characterize the 
macroeconomic environment. First, we capture the changing macroeconomic conditions 
using the GDP growth rate. Second, we use the ratio of the dollar value of loans provided by 
commercial banks over GDP. This variable captures changes in the average credit conditions 
nationally.
5
 These variables drop out when using time effects; thus, we employ them only to 
check the robustness of our results. Our data source for these variables is the Federal Reserve. 
 
                                                          
4
 We experiment with many other bank-specific control variables, such as the ratios of loans to assets, loans to 
deposits, and cost to income. The main results remain unaffected. 
5
 We experiment with many other macroeconomic variables as well as with regional dummies, etc. The results 
remain unaffected and are available on request. 
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3.2. Estimation of the profitability equation    
It is widely recognized in the banking literature that bank characteristics like risk and capital 
are endogenous in the profitability equation. A first concern, which is the most important in 
our case, relates to reverse causality. For example, a profitable bank will use part of the 
profits made at time t as loanable funds and another part as capital, creating an obvious 
reverse causality mechanism between banks’ returns and risk and equity capital. The richness 
of the data set (especially the quarterly time dimension) allows us to mitigate problems 
arising from reverse causality by using the first lags of the explanatory variables instead of 
their contemporaneous values. Thus, we assume that the bank characteristics at quarter t-1 
determine profits at time t.
6
 In this sense, we can rewrite equation (2) as 
     𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.    (7) 
Equation (7) is in line with the theoretical suggestion that bank managers decide on the level 
of credit risk today to materialize returns in a future date (e.g., Agur and Demertzis, 2012). 
To capture a different time pattern, where credit risk today materializes in returns at another 
quarter in the future, we also experiment with the fourth time lag on r and we show that this 
does not affect the results. Assuming no other source of endogeneity for the right-hand-side 
variables, we can estimate equation (7) with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors (e.g., Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010).
7
    
However, another source of endogeneity can arise from omitted variables bias. For 
example, risk-weighted assets and bank profits can move in the same direction owing to 
changes in the structural and macroeconomic conditions common to all banks. Further, it 
                                                          
6
 It would be more problematic to establish causality if we had annual data. In that case, profits would have been 
determined by the bank’s characteristics in the previous year. However, in empirical banking studies, one year 
can be a time period within which major changes can occur that affect bank performance.    
7
 As is well-known in the econometrics literature, estimation of an equation like (7) with a fixed effects model 
is, in general, inconsistent because of the correlation between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable. However, for panels with large time and cross-sectional dimensions, the estimates from different 
methods converge (Baltagi, 2008). We confirm this in the empirical analysis below.  
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could be the case that the relationship between risk-weighted assets and banks’ returns is 
affected by certain bank characteristics that are not controlled for in the empirical model. 
However, note that the empirical model includes both bank and time fixed effects, and these 
should lessen such a bias. To confirm that this type of endogeneity does not drive our results, 
we also use instrumental variables procedures such as the limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) for panel data with robust standard errors or the two-stage system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) of Blundell and Bond (1998) with robust standard 
errors (correction of Windmeijer, 2005). 
LIML is a two-stage procedure that requires at least one instrumental variable that 
does not have a direct effect on bank profitability or an effect running through omitted 
variables (i.e., validate the exclusion restriction). To this end, we use the implications of the 
recent literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and 
Peydro, 2014; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2011). This literature shows that low interest 
rates increase the average risk-taking behavior of banks for three main reasons. First, a shift 
from a high to low interest rate environment could leave financial institutions with long-term 
fixed rate contracts, seeking out riskier investments in an attempt to meet their liabilities 
(search-for-yield effect). Second, low rates boost asset and collateral values and tend to 
reduce price volatility, which in turn downsize bank estimates of probabilities of default and 
encourage higher risk positions (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Third, the commitment, for example, 
of a central bank for lower (future) interest rates in the case of a threatening shock reduces 
the probability of large downside risks, thereby encouraging banks to assume greater risk 
(transparency effect). Given the above, there should be a direct impact of monetary policy on 
banks’ credit risk. 
In addition, the exclusion restriction is validated if there is no significant correlation 
between the monetary policy variable and the stochastic term u in (7). One may argue that 
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bank profits could in fact react to a change in monetary policy (i) if this change is correlated 
with the general structural and macroeconomic conditions and (ii) through the noninterest 
income that is excluded from the risk-weighted assets. Concerning the first argument and in 
addition to the use of time fixed effects, we consider the exogenous monetary policy shocks. 
These are estimated using the so-called Taylor rule residuals obtained from the OLS 
regression of the federal funds rate on GDP growth and inflation (e.g., Maddaloni and 
Peydro, 2011; Brissimis, Delis, and Iosifidi, 2012). Concerning the second argument, the 
inclusion of noninterest income among the control variables reassures that the exogenous 
monetary shocks are not correlated with profits through their impact on sources of bank 
profits other than interest income.  
For the estimation of equation (7) using GMM, we augment the Taylor rule residuals 
with the second lags of all explanatory variables as instruments. By including the second lags 
as instruments (and not the first), we assume that all explanatory variables might be, to some 
extent, endogenous regressors in equation (7). This set of instruments produces acceptable 
values for the test for second-order autocorrelation and for the Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions (for details on these issues, see Roodman, 2009).  
However, before moving on to the analysis of the estimation results, we should note 
that what we seek is the robust estimation of the optimal level of credit risk from equation (4) 
given (2). We will show below that all three estimators considered (OLS on the fixed effects 
model, LIML, and GMM) yield more or less the same values for the optimal credit risk. We 
primarily attribute this to the fact that in very large panels such as ours, the results from all 
estimators converge and the fixed effects estimator becomes consistent as the time dimension 
of the panel increases (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, in our setting, even the simplest estimation 
methods, such as OLS, seem to produce robust estimates of the optimal credit risk.   
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4. Estimation results for the optimal credit risk 
4.1. Baseline estimation results and robustness 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of alternative specifications of equation (7). In 
all regressions, the dependent variable is the return on assets, except from that in column 
(10), where we use the return on equity. In line with the discussion in Section 2.1, all the 
results verify that the relationship between credit risk and bank profitability is an inverted U-
shape. In column (1), we start with a very simple model, which is estimated by OLS and 
fixed effects. In column (2), we add quarter fixed effects. The results from these first two 
specifications yield values for the optimal level of credit risk equal to 0.666 and 0.717, 
respectively (we report the optimal point in the line below the results for the coefficient 
estimates). The first value is approximately equal to the mean value of risk-weighted assets in 
our sample (see Table 2), and the second is slightly higher, showing that the average bank in 
our panel could benefit by taking on a slightly higher amount of credit risk.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In columns (3) and (4), we introduce a number of bank-level control variables in the 
equations with and without quarter fixed effects, respectively. The results show a slight 
decrease in the value of the optimal credit risk in the model without quarter effects, while the 
optimal point in the model with quarter effects is about the same as the equivalent in column 
(2). We feel that this pattern in the results comes from the importance of including quarter 
fixed effects in reducing the omitted variables bias. Moreover, in column (5), we drop the 
quarter effects and add year effects among the explanatory variables, and this yields very 
similar results to those in column (4). Further, in columns (6) and (7), we introduce the two 
macroeconomic variables, named Growth and Credit by banks. To do this, we drop the 
quarter effects (due to collinearity) and only add year effects in column (7). Evidently, both 
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the coefficient estimates and the level of optimal bank credit risk remain practically 
unaffected.    
 So far, we have estimated equation (7) using OLS. We now relax the assumption that 
there is no endogeneity arising from omitted variables bias and use LIML and GMM for 
dynamic panels. We present the results from these regressions in columns (8) and (9). The 
results from the LIML and GMM estimates show that the optimal level of credit risk is 0.7 
and 0.727, respectively. Thus, the optimal level of credit risk is not significantly driven by the 
estimation method. We also confirm this finding for the other specifications of equation (7). 
This is an expected finding because for large panels the results from all estimators converge 
(Baltagi, 2008). Thus, the OLS model with bank fixed effects and quarter fixed effects seems 
to be sufficient to robustly estimate the optimal level of credit risk, and is the one favored in 
the rest of the specifications owing to its simplicity and asymptotic efficiency.  
In column (10) we examine the sensitivity of the results to the use of the return on 
equity as the dependent variable. We find that the optimal level of credit risk is equal to 
0.715, which is almost equal to the equivalent specification with the return on assets as the 
dependent variable, i.e., that in column (4). Further, in column (11) we control for the bank 
regulatory capital ratio instead of the total capital ratio and in column (12) we control for both 
ratios. The reason is that safety and soundness might not be based only on total equity capital 
but also on regulatory capital. The two ratios have a correlation coefficient equal to 0.82 (see 
Table 3.1) and the results in columns (10) and (11) of Table 4 are a clear indication of 
collinearity. Importantly, however, the optimal level of risk remains at levels approximately 
equal to those of the previous regressions.  
In Table 5 we examine the sensitivity of our results to the use of delinquent loans as 
our measure for bank credit risk. The inverted U-shaped relation between risk and returns 
continues to hold. Also, the optimal points on the delinquent loans are somewhat above the 
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average of delinquent loans (equal to 0.013), irrespective of whether we control for the major 
loan categories (see column 2) or whether we use the return on equity instead of the return on 
assets. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As a final sensitivity analysis of these baseline results, we consider whether the 
optimal level of credit risk changes when we assume a different time structure for our data or 
a different lag structure for risk-weighted assets. We first use annual and bi-annual averages 
of our data, instead of quarterly data. This allows examining whether bank managers have a 
longer-term horizon in their decision-making on credit risk.
8
 We report the results in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 6 and we find that the results are equivalent to those of Table 4.    
Next, we report the results from a model where the lagged dependent variable is 
excluded from the analysis (column 3 of Table 6). The coefficient estimates on risk-weighted 
assets and its squared term gain somewhat in economic significance, but the optimal point is 
not significantly affected. Further, we simultaneously use the first three lags of risk-weighted 
assets and its squared term in column (4). This specification implicitly assumes that the risk 
decisions of bank managers in quarters t-1 to t-3 affect bank performance at time t. Adding 
up the coefficients from the three lags and taking the derivative as in equation (4) yields an 
optimal level of credit risk very similar to that reported in Table 4.  
Finally, in column (5), we report the results from the specification where risk-
weighted assets and its squared term are lagged four times (i.e., we use the annual lag). In this 
specification, we assume that the risk decisions of banks at quarter t-4 affect the profitability 
at quarter t. Under this assumption, the level of the optimal credit risk equals 0.67, which is 
only 0.04 points lower than the one identified in column (4) of Table 4. We consider many 
other variants for the lag structure of the risk-weighted assets, including the simultaneous 
                                                          
8
 Using annual and bi-annual data also allows reducing our sample size and examining the sensitivity of the 
main regression coefficients and the optimal point of credit risk.  
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inclusion of the first four, first eight, and first 16 lags. Changes in the optimal level of credit 
risk are not significant and these results are available on request.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7 we extend our analysis by using subsamples of banks based on their size 
and capitalization. The first regression is based on a subsample of banks with total assets 
above the 90
th
 percentile of the full sample, while the second regression on banks with total 
assets below the 50
th
 percentile (a summary of these percentiles with the corresponding cut-
off values is given in Table 8). The results show that the large banks have a lower optimal 
point compared to the small banks, which is intuitive given their more complex 
organizational structure, the wider array of products, and the increasing holdings of short-
term assets that bear lower risk weights.
9
 In turn, columns (3) and (4) report the equivalent 
results for the well-capitalized and the poorly-capitalized banks, respectively. In line with our 
expectations, we find that poorly capitalized banks have a lower optimal level of credit risk 
(these banks have a lower capacity to take on credit risk).  
[Insert Table 7 & Table 8 about here] 
 So far, we have identified that the optimal level of credit risk for the average bank in 
our sample is between 0.69 and 0.71 for the most prominent specifications of equation (7). 
These values are somewhat higher than the actual value of risk-weighted assets for the 
average bank, showing that banks could on average gain in their short-term profitability by 
increasing their risk. The coefficient estimate in column (4) of Table 4 shows that a one 
standard deviation increase in risk-weighted assets will increase the return on assets of the 
average bank by approximately 0.04 points (up to the point where risk-weighted assets equals 
0.71). Thus, for example, a 0.04 increase in risk-weighted assets from 0.67 to 0.71 will raise 
the return on assets by approximately 0.0016. Considering that the return on assets for the 
                                                          
9
 We carry out the same analysis using the 50bn USD as the threshold for large banks (instead of the 90
th
 
percentile). The results are very similar to those reported in column (1) of Table 6. 
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average bank equals 0.007, this is a very large increase (approximately equal to 23%). Of 
course, this result is valid under the assumption that the optimal point is constant across time 
and banks with different characteristics. We relax this assumption below.    
 
4.2. Time-varying optimal credit risk 
In this section, we consider whether the optimal level of credit risk varies with time. To 
identify this time-varying optimal level, we consider estimating the equation 
𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +     
∑ 𝑓𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 𝑞𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 𝑞𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + ∑ ℎ𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,    (8) 
where qj are quarter dummies. Therefore, in equation (8), we obtain time-varying coefficients 
for r and r
2
 by interacting these variables with the quarter fixed effects.
10
 Subsequently, we 
calculate the optimal level of credit risk at each quarter t from the equation  
𝜕𝛱𝑡
𝜕𝑟𝑡−1
= 0 => 𝑟𝑡−1 = −
𝑎1+𝑓𝑗
2(𝑎2+𝑔𝑗)
 .       (9) 
 In Table 9, we present the estimation results from three different specifications of 
equation (8).
11
 In the first two columns, we present the results from equations with the return 
on assets and the return on equity as dependent variables. In column (3), we present the 
equivalent results when we use delinquent loans instead of risk-weighted assets.   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In Figure 1, we plot the time-varying coefficient estimates (solid line), along with 
associated confidence intervals, against the quarterly average of risk-weighted assets 
(realized credit risk). Clearly, the two are not equal, reflecting a short-term disequilibrium in 
the handling of risk-weighted assets by bank managers. The quarterly trend of the optimal 
                                                          
10
 One could instead consider a time-varying model (e.g., Swamy, 1970). However, this class of models does not 
run for a panel with a size such as ours using a CORE i7vPro processor and 6.00 GB of RAM. 
11
 Owing to space considerations, we do not replicate the full set of results in Tables 4 to 7. We rely on the 
equivalent specifications to the ones presented in columns (4) and (10) of Table 4 and of column (1) of Table 5. 
Similar to the findings in Section 3.1, changes in the results from using the other specifications are insignificant.  
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risk reveals an interesting pattern. During the relatively good periods for the economy, the 
optimal level of credit risk is above the average credit risk, while the opposite is true after 
relatively bad periods. For example, consider the period before the attack on the World Trade 
Centre in 2001. For about two years after the attack, the optimal level of credit risk remained 
below its average value. Subsequently, in most of the period 2003–2007, which is a period of 
considerable expansion in risk-weighted assets, the optimal credit risk is again higher than the 
average. Finally, since 2008, the optimal credit risk remains at the lowest level of our sample 
period, well below the realized level of credit risk.     
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 This observed pattern has a number of economic implications. First and most obvious, 
the optimal level of credit risk leads the business cycle, while the realized credit risk follows 
the business cycle closely. Second, during good economic periods, the average bank has clear 
incentives to take on higher credit risk to maximize profits. However, this optimal bank 
behavior changes very quickly when adverse shocks hit the economy, leaving banks exposed 
to higher than optimal levels of risk. This stems from (i) the standard issue of maturity 
mismatch between bank assets and liabilities, (ii) the changing informational asymmetry 
(moral hazard and adverse selection) over the business and credit cycles, which cause 
changes in the efficient intermediation of funds (e.g. Duran and Lozano-Vivas, 2014), and 
(iii) the herding behavior of banks, which can cause by itself a disequilibrium situation in the 
risk-taking behavior of the banking sector. It is fairly obvious from Figure 1 that banks could 
not lower the level of credit risk close to the optimal level when the depth of the financial 
crisis became apparent in 2008. This is most probably owing to the fact that banks could not 
lower the volume of long-term loans, many of which were in fact nonperforming. 
 There are two more implications emerging from Figure 1. On the one hand, the 
average bank has clear economic incentives to take on higher credit risk during good 
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economic times in search for yield. Yet, what is optimal from the micromanagerial 
perspective is far from optimal from the macroprudential perspective. Phrased differently, the 
level of credit risk that maximizes bank profits can be unsustainable in the long run, either 
because of the inability of banks to adjust their portfolios quickly in case of adverse 
developments or because of myopic behavior attributed to herding. On the other hand, the 
average bank does not have to be the one causing the crisis. It can take only a small number 
of very risky players to increase systemic risk to very high levels. Therefore, the fact that the 
optimal credit risk is higher than the realized one for some time before 2007 does not 
necessarily mean that this average bank behavior caused the subprime meltdown. Clearly, 
this requires additional analysis.    
 We can check this latter hypothesis by examining the risky behavior of the banks that 
failed in the period 2008–2009. In Figure 2, we replicate Figure 1, but we also add the 
quarterly average of risk-weighted assets of the banks that failed. Evidently, these banks have 
an average ratio of risk-weighted assets higher than the optimal level in almost the entire 
2001–2008 period. This observation makes a case for bad managerial decisions for the 
involved banks, lack of private monitoring and market discipline, as well as inefficient 
supervision.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 In Figure 3 we examine the time path of the optimal credit risk using delinquent loans 
as our credit-risk measure (coefficients obtained from column 3 of Table 9). Even though 
delinquent loans have only increased contemporaneously with the eruption of the crisis in 
2007 (i.e., this measure does not capture the increase in bank risk in the period 2002-2006), 
we do find evidence (with a lag) for a similar cyclical pattern for the optimal credit risk. 
Specifically, in the period 2005-2007 the optimal credit risk is above the mean delinquent 
loans, while from 2008 onward the optimal value falls below the mean delinquent loans. The 
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lag in this cyclicality vis-à-vis the findings on risk-weighted assets reflects the fact that the 
latter measure of credit risk better proxies, for the goals of our study, the ex ante risk-
management decisions of bank managers.       
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 In Figures 4 to 7 we plot the time-varying coefficient estimates from the results of 
Table 10. Figure 4 shows the optimal credit risk for the large banks and reveals that this 
optimal level fares very close to the average level of risk-weighted assets. In contrast, Figure 
5 shows that it is the medium and smaller banks that mostly generate the cyclical behavior of 
optimal credit risk shown in Figure 1. Similarly, we find a major difference between the time 
paths of optimal credit risk for the well- and the poorly-capitalized banks (Figures 6 and 7, 
respectively). For the well-capitalized banks, the time path looks quite similar to the one of 
Figure 4. In contrast, for the poorly-capitalized banks the optimal credit risk is lower than 
their average in the period 2005Q3 to 2008Q1.     
[Insert Table 10 & Figures 4-7 about here] 
 These findings have some important implications. First, the large, systemically 
important banks seem to have the technological expertise to operate closer to their risk-taking 
capacity in both good and bad economic periods. However, this also reveals that they are on 
average more risky compared to the smaller banks that have a substantial gap between the 
optimal and the realized credit risk in normal economic periods. Second, the poorly-
capitalized banks “gamble for resurrection” in the period before the eruption of the crisis. 
This finding is in line with the theoretical implications of Murdock, Hellmann and Stiglitz 
(2000) and calls for better regulatory monitoring of the risk-taking behavior of the banks with 
low levels of capital.
12
   
 
                                                          
12
 On the same line, Delis, Staikouras, and Tsoumas (2013) show that high risk-weighted asset ratios tend to 
attract supervisory intervention, albeit in a rather delayed manner that amplifies the risk of insolvency.   
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5. Optimal credit risk and the macroeconomic environment 
5.1. Theoretical considerations 
The subprime financial and the subsequent euro-area crises recalled, in the most emphatic 
way, the importance of the banking sector in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In Figure 1 
we infer that the cyclicality of the optimal bank credit risk is a leading indicator of the 
business cycle and that realized credit risk is procyclical. Thus, the two indicators allow 
drawing some new insights into the interplay between banks’ risk and the monetary and 
macroeconomic environment.  
 In Section 3.2, we highlight the main mechanisms through which low interest rates 
can increase bank risk and show that the empirical literature rules in favor of a negative 
relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk. The theory behind the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy provides more mixed results. The models typically assume that 
banks choose their asset mix and leverage to maximize profits (e.g., Agur and Demertzis, 
2012; Dell’ Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2014). This setup allows banks to choose between 
a continuum of risky assets and different risk profiles. In either way, these theoretical 
frameworks predict that the nexus between monetary policy and bank risk depends on many 
factors, including the relative health of the banking system, the efficiency level of banks, and 
the state of the macroeconomic environment.  
From our viewpoint, the studies by Agur and Demertzis (2012; 2013) are quite 
important in that banks choose their asset profile according to their efficiency. This is 
relevant to our empirical model in that inefficient banking can cause deviations from the 
optimal level of risk. Thus, by affecting both the cost of debt financing (thus also the realized 
credit risk) and the optimal debt choice of the bank, monetary policy can affect the gap 
between the realized and the optimal credit risk. The issue here is that an expansionary 
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monetary policy positively affects asset and collateral values, and banks appear to have less 
risky portfolios. In other words, this mechanism is about the risk already present in bank 
portfolios and not solely about new risk. Our measures of realized and optimal credit risk 
correspond exactly to this theoretical interpretation of the nexus between monetary policy and 
bank risk, making our variables ideal to study the macroeconomic implications of optimal vs. 
realized credit risk.  
In this framework, our analysis is concerned with testing macroeconomic equilibrium 
relationships among the monetary conditions, realized credit risk taken by banks, and optimal 
risk that maximizes bank profits within a time-series setting. This strategy has the obvious 
advantage of considering a limited number of variables and using all these variables as 
endogenous. With these issues in mind we proceed to the time-series empirical analysis.  
 
5.2. Empirical analysis  
We capture the complex interactions between the relevant variables with a system of 
equations approach, which allows for rich dynamics; namely, we apply an atheoretical VAR 
model. This model is used instead of the usual structural simultaneous equation model 
because the underlying theory dictating the variables in the structural system of equations for 
the subject at hand has not yet been well-established. In this way we avoid the a priori 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables and we do not have to impose 
arbitrary constraints to ensure identification. Given that many of the relevant variables are 
non-stationary, a variant of the VAR model will be used, namely the VECM (see also 
Granger, 2004). 
The VECM takes the form 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐹𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑗𝛥𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + 𝑒𝑡 ,                (10) 
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where Y is the (4X1) vector of endogenous variables, F and Γi are (4X4) matrices, and p is the 
lag length of the corresponding VAR. The disturbances 𝑒𝑡 are assumed to follow a four-
dimensional Gaussian process with a zero mean and a nonsingular, finite, covariance matrix 
Ω. The four endogenous variables we use are (i) the federal funds rate (ffr) as our measure of 
the monetary conditions,
13
 (ii) the series of the optimal bank risk (optimal risk), (iii) the series 
of the realized bank risk (realized risk), and (iv) real output (measured by the log of real 
GDP). 
The results from two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) and the GLS Dickey Fuller (Elliott et al., 1996) tests, show that all four 
variables are stationary in first differences (Table 11). Thus, the above series are well-
modeled by unit root processes and the use of the VECM model is necessary.  
Two or more unit root processes may behave erratically at the individual level but 
there may be a surprising relationship that binds them together: their distance is never too big. 
This means that in the long run there is an equilibrium, which can be described from the 
model 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where  𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑡 is the relation between the two variables in 
equilibrium and 𝑢𝑡 is the stationary error term describing the short-run deviations from this 
equilibrium. If such a long-run relationship exists then, in the time-series terminology, the 
variables are said to be cointegrated and [1 β]' is called the cointegrating vector, which 
determines the long run equilibrium.  
To test for cointegration, we employ Johansen’s (1988) system approach. We 
consider all possible lag orders selected by the model selection criteria, namely the Akaike 
Information Criterion, the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion, the Final Prediction 
                                                          
13
 Given that in the VECM, all variables are allowed to be endogenous by definition, we use the federal funds 
rate instead of the Taylor rule residuals that we used as an instrumental variable above (e.g., Buch, Eickmeier, 
and Prieto, 2010). Note that since the impact of policy shocks is through bank risk (either credit risk or 
noninterest income), the inclusion of the federal funds rate as an independent variable in equations (7) and (8) 
would not have any implications for the modelling choices in identifying the optimal level of bank risk. If 
anything, this would be owing to multicollineartiy, which we do not find to be present.  
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Error Criterion, and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. These criteria are 
asymptotically equivalent but their results may vary in small samples. In theory, selecting the 
number of lagged differences to be smaller than the correct one will distort the size of the 
tests, while selecting orders greater than the correct one will result in loss of power. Given the 
sample size, the maximum possible lag order is set to four.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
When testing for the rank of the full system at the 5% level, the results show two 
cointegrating vectors if the selected lag length is one and one cointegrating vector if the 
selected lag length is two. We end up choosing a lag length equal to two, because selecting a 
lagged order smaller than the true results in inconsistent tests. Thus, our analysis considers 
the following (one) cointegrating relationship:  
[1 𝛽1 𝛽2   𝛽3] [
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑟
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
].       (11) 
The tests so far provide evidence in favor of a long-run equilibrium between the four 
variables; however, this equilibrium must be estimated. In other words, we need to estimate 
the cointegrating vector, i.e., the betas in equation (11). These betas exist inside the matrix 𝐹 
in model (10). Thus, we estimate the VECM using the reduced rank procedure of Johansen 
(1995) and provide the estimation results in Table 12. For the optimal lag order, we again 
consider all four information criteria. However, these criteria disagree, providing values equal 
to either zero (for the Schwartz criterion) or four (for the other three). We choose the most 
general order of four lags.  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Table 12 reports the estimation results of the cointegrating vector. Based on the 
estimation results we can rewrite the cointegrating relationship as: 
output = -0.352*ffr - 15.982*realized risk + 22.819*optimal risk             (12) 
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The above coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: in the long run, where the 
system is in equilibrium, an increase by 1% in the federal funds rate will result in a 0.352% 
drop in output growth. All coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
post-estimation Lagrange-multiplier tests by Johansen (1995) show that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals.
14
 The Jarque-Bera test for normality does not reject the null 
hypothesis of normal residuals in any of the four equations.
15
 Finally, we examine the 
stability of the coefficients of the model to guarantee that these are not affected by structural 
breaks. In Figure 8 we show the results for the recursive eigenvalue test of Hansen and 
Johansen (1999). The test does not reject the hypothesis of the long-run parameter stability of 
the eigenvalue at the 5% level.  
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 Besides the long-run equilibrium, from the estimated VECM model we also infer the 
short-run adjustment mechanism that describes how the variables will react when they are 
pushed out of the long-run equilibrium by an exogenous shock or innovation. The following 
analysis uses the estimated VECM to examine how variables in the system respond to a 
shock (impulse) in one of them. We are primarily interested in the orthogonal impulse 
responses involving the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 5.1, which we present 
in Figures 9 to 11. Figure 9 shows that the realized credit risk responds positively and 
significantly to a positive change in the optimal credit risk. This effect is apparent even from 
Figure 1 and is intuitive: When banks view that their optimal strategy to maximize profits is 
to take on higher credit risks, they are willing to do so in the next quarter.   
[Insert Figures 9-11 about here] 
 Figure 10 shows the response of the realized credit risk to a monetary policy shock. In 
the first five to six quarters, a monetary contraction (rise in the interest rate) reduces banks’ 
                                                          
14
 The p-values for two additional lags are 0.076 and 0.41. 
15
 The Jarque-Bera p-values for the four equations are 0.28, 0.06, 0.39, and 0.46. 
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risk and vice versa. This result confirms the findings of the empirical literature on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro, 2009; Delis, Hasan and 
Mylonidis, 2011). However, Figure 11 shows that a negative monetary policy shock (rise in 
the interest rate) raises the optimal risk-weighted assets of banks. The response is a positive 
and statistically significant one, which lasts over the long-term. The level of the increase is 
also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate will 
increase the optimal risk-weighted assets by approximately 0.010 points in the first year and 
for each year thereafter. For a bank with an optimal level of risk-weighted assets, as given by 
specification (4) of Table 4, this will imply a rise of the optimal level from 0.711 to 0.723, 
which is indeed a large fluctuation for one year. 
 An explanation for this finding is that a reduction in the policy rate leads to lower 
deposit rates. Because the loan demand is negatively sloped, the reduction in deposit rates is 
only partially passed to the lending rates. This increases the intermediation margin and 
provides banks with incentives to take on higher risks, because expected profits will also be 
higher. Given the implications of Figure 10, banks will do so in the next period, and this 
diminishes the original negative shock presented in Figure 11 after period six. Thus, we offer 
an additional mechanism working along with the negative effect of monetary policy on 
banks’ risk.  
 The most interesting implication of this case comes from the fact that a monetary 
policy shock tends to pull the realized and the optimal credit risk further apart in the short 
run. Phrased differently, the optimal monetary policy from a business-cycle perspective will 
always widen the gap between the realized and optimal credit risk of banks, pushing banks 
out of equilibrium. To see this, consider the following sequence of events. In good economic 
periods, interest rates are higher to prevent the economy from over-burning. Based on our 
impulse responses, the rise in interest rates will lower the realized credit risk (Figure 10) and 
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increase the optimal credit risk (Figure 11). Given that in these periods, the optimal credit 
risk is usually higher than the realized credit risk (Figure 1), the gap between the two widens. 
A similar result emerges in bad economic periods, where the optimal monetary policy is to 
cut rates. This leads to an increase in the realized credit risk and a fall in the optimal credit 
risk. Given that in these periods, the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk, the result is 
again a widening in the gap between the two. 
 Another mechanism through which changes in the monetary policy rate distort the 
equilibrium risk behavior of banks relates to the interest-rate risk. This is the risk that the 
value of real assets will change owing to a change in the absolute level of interest rates, in the 
spread between two rates, in the shape of the yield curve, or in any other interest rate 
relationship. Naturally, all these interest rates are affected by the central bank rate. Our 
analysis is then consistent with the idea that following a monetary policy shock, it takes 
banks considerable time to adjust their valuation of assets and determine the optimal level of 
credit risk. In the meantime, the average bank either does not have the capacity to estimate 
the effect of interest-rate risk on its portfolio and determine its actual level of credit risk in 
the very short run or maturity mismatch does not allow the bank to quickly adjust in light of 
the monetary shock. This is also the essence of the theoretical model of Agur and Demertzis 
(2013) who show that because bank risk cannot be easily adjusted in the short run, monetary 
policy cuts should be short-lived to prevent excessive risk buildup.  
In the VECM presented above, one can include a measure of bank capitalization or 
other macroeconomic variables, such as the inflation rate or a measure of monetary 
aggregates. This exercise yields very similar results, which are available on request. In 
addition, one can use the rest of the time series produced by the other specifications in Tables 
8 and 9 or the equivalent ones in Tables 4-7. Again, the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar. One can further infer on the effect of the monetary-policy-induced 
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disequilibrium in banks’ optimal risky strategy on real output. Our results show that the 
widening of the gap increases output in good economic times and decreases output in bad 
economic times. In other words, monetary policy can increase macroeconomic fluctuations 
through its impact on “disequilibrium banking.” However, we should treat this result with 
caution as general implications for the real economy would probably need a more lengthy 
time series with additional business cycles. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy considerations 
This paper identifies for the first time the level of banks’ credit risk that maximizes profits 
using the full sample of US banks over the period 1996Q1–2011Q4. This optimal 
(equilibrium) level of credit risk is different from the actual realized credit risk present in 
bank portfolios and reflects the level of credit risk a bank would take if it were to function in 
a fully-efficient profit-maximizing way and perfectly forecast the upcoming macroeconomic 
conditions, while prudential regulation would assist banks toward these goals. This “idyllic” 
situation would essentially reduce the probability of default to a minimum, primarily by 
reducing the effects of maturity mismatch and fluctuating asymmetric information on the 
probability of bank default.  
 We show that the optimal credit risk for the average bank leads the business cycle, 
while the realized credit risk closely follows the business cycle. In good economic periods, 
which are characterized by credit expansion, the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized 
risk, while this picture completely reverses in bad economic periods. Subsequently, using an 
error correction model, we demonstrate that the optimal monetary policy in smoothing the 
business cycle always leads to an increase in the gap between the equilibrium and realized 
credit risk of banks. This is because a contractionary monetary policy in good economic 
periods, where the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized risk, decreases the realized 
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credit risk but increases the optimal credit risk. Similarly, an expansionary monetary policy in 
bad economic periods, where the optimal credit risk is lower than the realized risk, increases 
the realized credit risk but decreases the optimal credit risk. 
 In essence, our results offer another point in favor of the proponents of counter-
cyclical bank regulation in the form of capital requirements and of those suggesting that 
monetary policy should lean against the wind. The obvious implication is that monetary 
policy and prudential regulation need to be closely linked to prevent the disequilibrium 
situation described in this paper. In fact, there are three choices: the conduct of monetary 
policy will incorporate elements of bank risk and financial stability or prudential bank 
regulation will be cyclical, or both. Strong steps toward the implementation of monetary 
policy within a framework that encompasses elements of prudent bank behavior have recently 
been enacted by the European Single Supervisory Mechanism. Within this mechanism, the 
prudent behavior of systemic European banks and the monetary tasks of the European Central 
Bank take place in the same body (the Governing council), awarding monetary policy a 
flavor of financial stability for the first time in the history of the European Monetary Union. 
These suggestions have their own merits and drawbacks and the literature on this 
issue is flourishing. For example, Angeloni and Faia (2010) employ a standard dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium framework extended to incorporate the banking sector and 
show that the best policy (out of a set of policies that they consider) for crisis prevention is 
the combination of mild anti-cyclical capital requirements and a monetary policy that reacts 
to inflation and “leans-against-the-winds.” Similar results are obtained by Gambacorta and 
Signoretti (2012). It is apparent that more work is required on the real outcomes of the pass-
through of monetary policy through banks. It is also apparent that the implementation of the 
new banking regulation regime under Basel III should consider the effects of monetary policy 
in shaping equilibrium bank behavior.     
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
   
A. Dependent variables 
 
Return on assets (ROA) Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Call reports 
Return on equity (ROE) Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
 
 
B. Explanatory variables 
   
Risk weighted assets Risk-weighted assets/ total assets Call reports 
Risk-based capital ratio Total risk-based capital/ risk weighted assets Call reports 
Bank size Natural logarithm of real total assets Call reports 
Capital Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
Liquidity Liquid assets (cash and short-term government bonds)/ total assets Call reports 
Non-interest income Non-interest income/ total income Call reports 
Problem loans Non-performing loans (>90 days)/ total loans Call reports 
Provisions Loan loss provisions/ total loans Call reports 
Growth GDP growth rate (annual %) Federal Reserve 
Credit by banks Loans provided by commercial banks/ GDP Federal Reserve 
Federal funds rate The effective federal funds rate Federal Reserve 
CPI 
Delinquent loans 
Commercial loans 
Loans to individuals 
Consumer Price Index 
30-89 days delinquent loans/ total loans 
Commercial loans/ total loans 
Loans to individuals/ total loans 
Federal Reserve 
Call reports 
Call reports 
Call reports 
Real estate loans Real estate loans/ total loans Call reports 
Other loans Other loans/ total loans Call reports 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 574,532 0.007 0.010 -0.257 0.488 
ROE 574,532 0.077 0.103 -1.994 1.970 
Risk-weighted assets 574,532 0.670 0.132 0.100 0.998 
Risk-based capital ratio 574,532 0.178 0.136 -0.344 9.228 
Bank size 574,532 11.786 1.367 6.889 21.584 
Capital 574,532 0.107 0.053 -0.242 1.000 
Liquidity 574,532 0.060 0.063 0.000 0.909 
Non-interest income 574,532 0.111 0.087 0.000 1.000 
Problem loans 574,532 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.748 
Provisions 574,532 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.748 
Growth 574,532 0.024 0.020 -0.046 0.052 
Credit by banks 526,497 959.1 354.2 510.7 1,796.4 
Federal funds rate 574,532 3.245 2.139 0.073 6.520 
Consumer price index 574,532 0.610 0.529 -2.300 1.600 
Delinquent loans 
Commercial loans 
329,126 
99,820 
0.013 
0.142 
0.014 
0.089 
0.000 
0.000 
0.385 
0.929 
Loans to individuals 99,820 0.077 0.074 0.000 0.966 
Real estate loans 99,820 0.680 0.178 0.007 0.999 
Other loans 99,820 0.100 0.132 0.000 0.855 
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Table 3.2 
Correlations matrix for the sample containing the delinquent loans data and controls 
     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Risk-weighted assets 1.000                 
2. Risk-based capital ratio -0.608 1.000                
3. Bank size 0.2548 -0.3049 1.000               
4. Capital -0.2218 0.7801 -0.229 1.000              
5. Liquidity -0.2285 0.2116 -0.2518 0.0949 1.000             
6. Non-interest income 0.0258 -0.1278 0.2736 -0.1345 0.0522 1.000            
7. Problem loans 0.0685 -0.0375 0.0242 -0.0115 0.0139 0.0108 1.000           
8. Provisions -0.1502 0.3217 -0.1423 0.2409 0.1081 0.0005 0.3023 1.000          
9. Growth -0.0594 0.043 -0.0464 0.0072 -0.0341 0.0586 -0.1808 0.0108 1.000         
10. Federal funds rate 0.0365 0.0113 -0.015 0.0097 -0.1092 -0.1156 -0.1573 -0.0589 0.2924 1.000        
11. Credit by banks -0.0238 0.0015 -0.0471 -0.0144 -0.0153 -0.1152 -0.0532 -0.0212 -0.268 0.306 1.000       
12. CPI 0.0071 0.0143 -0.008 0.0108 -0.0458 0.0053 -0.0694 -0.0123 0.3903 0.2985 -0.1182 1.000      
13. Delinquent loans -0.1131 0.1181 -0.1782 0.0835 0.0575 -0.0577 0.1974 0.1453 -0.0622 -0.0249 0.0394 -0.0328 1.000     
14. Commercial loans 0.0069 0.1151 -0.0237 0.0717 0.0599 0.0304 0.0021 0.1638 0.0126 0.005 0.0079 0.0019 -0.0072 1.000    
15. Loans to individuals -0.2414 0.27 -0.1928 0.1256 0.1292 0.0696 -0.0559 0.1699 0.0451 0.0078 0.0691 0.0009 0.1707 0.557 1.000   
16. Real Estate loans -0.0258 0.0906 0.043 0.0374 0.0464 0.0246 -0.0036 0.0867 0.0011 -0.0051 -0.016 0.001 -0.017 0.7826 0.4342 1.000  
17. Other loans 0.0008 0.1524 -0.3527 0.1814 0.0833 -0.1629 -0.0148 0.1727 -0.0041 -0.0032 0.001 -0.0017 -0.0164 0.168 0.0875 0.0551 1.000 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Full Sample Correlations matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Risk-weighted assets 1.000            
2. Risk-based capital ratio -0.453 1.000           
3. Bank size 0.229 -0.252 1.000          
4. Capital -0.174 0.822 -0.237 1.000         
5. Liquidity -0.269 0.222 -0.203 0.121 1.000        
6. Non-interest income 0.007 -0.026 0.275 -0.013 0.095 1.000       
7. Problem loans 0.048 -0.046 0.001 -0.032 0.067 0.021 1.000      
8. Provisions -0.053 0.172 -0.036 0.147 0.123 0.111 0.326 1.000     
9. Growth -0.130 0.042 -0.153 0.004 -0.008 -0.052 -0.164 -0.021 1.000    
10. Federal funds rate -0.065 0.051 -0.183 0.268 -0.089 -0.169 -0.201 -0.087 0.540 1.000   
11. Credit by banks -0.153 0.049 -0.228 0.003 0.022 -0.158  -0.107 -0.021 0.437 0.696 1.000  
12. CPI 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.007 -0.042 0.008 -0.051 -0.018 0.281 0.169 -0.090 1.000 
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Table 4 
Optimal bank credit risk: Basic specifications 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.566*** 
(70.899) 
0.551*** 
(64.012) 
0.513*** 
(54.055) 
0.503*** 
(49.960) 
0.488*** 
(48.452) 
0.492*** 
(48.236) 
0.483*** 
(46.085) 
0.480*** 
(35.473) 
0.882*** 
(20.973) 
 0.508*** 
(52.091) 
0.503*** 
(49.967) 
ROE t-1 
 
         0.521*** 
(78.613) 
  
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.048*** 
(15.107) 
0.056*** 
(16.675) 
0.033*** 
(10.726) 
0.037*** 
(11.846) 
0.040*** 
(12.784) 
0.044*** 
(11.913) 
0.043*** 
(11.736) 
0.748*** 
(5.981) 
0.186*** 
(3.270) 
0.139*** 
(7.361) 
0.035*** 
(10.469) 
0.040*** 
(12.860) 
Risk-weighted assets
2 
t-1 -0.036*** 
(-15.298) 
-0.039*** 
(-16.187) 
-0.024*** 
(-10.853) 
-0.026*** 
(-11.500) 
-0.028*** 
(-12.255) 
-0.032*** 
(-11.758) 
-0.030*** 
(-11.228) 
-0.530*** 
(-6.014) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.137) 
-0.097*** 
(-6.858) 
-0.026*** 
(-10.583) 
-0.028*** 
(-12.572) 
Bank size t-1   -0.001*** 
(-14.341) 
0.001*** 
(11.999) 
0.001*** 
(12.680) 
0.000*** 
(4.269) 
0.001*** 
(11.459) 
-0.003*** 
(-6.825) 
0.005 
(1.029) 
0.005*** 
(7.112) 
0.001*** 
(13.995) 
0.001*** 
(11.993) 
Capital t-1   -0.018*** 
(-16.383) 
-0.013*** 
(-11.323) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.831) 
-0.015*** 
(-12.456) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.175) 
0.013*** 
(2.435) 
0.068** 
(2.369) 
-0.093*** 
(-15.836) 
 -0.015*** 
(-9.074) 
Risk-based capital ratio t-1           -0.004*** 
(-7.207) 
0.001* 
(1.850) 
Liquidity t-1   -0.003*** 
(-6.118) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.121) 
-0.003*** 
(-7.738) 
-0.004*** 
(-7.464) 
-0.004*** 
(-8.271) 
0.020*** 
(4.684) 
0.022 
(0.608) 
-0.027*** 
(-7.724) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.201) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.258) 
Non-interest income t-1   0.006*** 
(9.214) 
0.008*** 
(12.308) 
0.008*** 
(11.755) 
0.008*** 
(11.781) 
0.008*** 
(11.416) 
0.003*** 
(4.070) 
0.013 
(0.624) 
0.063*** 
(12.501) 
0.008*** 
(12.160) 
0.008*** 
(12.348) 
Problem loans t-1   -0.079*** 
(-30.994) 
-0.069*** 
(-28.153) 
-0.072*** 
(-28.938) 
-0.076*** 
(-28.655) 
-0.074*** 
(-27.756) 
-0.087*** 
(-27.757) 
-0.094 
(-0.931) 
-0.896*** 
(-28.057) 
-0.068*** 
(-28.000) 
-0.069*** 
(-28.182) 
Provisions t-1   0.005 
(0.576) 
0.000 
(-0.022) 
-0.005 
(-0.606) 
-0.004 
(-0.456) 
-0.009 
(-0.960) 
0.082*** 
(4.892) 
0.443 
(1.332) 
-0.299*** 
(-4.937) 
0.002 
(0.276) 
-0.001 
(-0.128) 
Growth t-1      0.032*** 
(38.715) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.146) 
     
Credit by banks t-1      0.000* 
(12.631) 
0.000*** 
(8.191) 
     
Optimal point 0.666*** 0.717*** 0.687*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 0.687*** 0.716*** 0.700*** 0.727*** 0.715*** 0.689*** 0.710*** 
Quarter fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No 
Observations 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 509,445 509,445 540,550 508,512 557,179 557,179 557,179 
R-square (overall) 0.330 0.373 0.356 0.390 0.363 0.359 0.364   0.378 0.388 0.390 
UIT (p-value)        0.000     
WIT (Wald statistic)        28.742     
OIT (p-value)        0.354 0.379    
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of variants of equation (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. Regressions (1) to (7) and (10) to 
(12) are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors. Regression (8) is estimated with LIML on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors. 
Regression (9) is estimated with the Arellano and Bond (1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors. UIT is the p-value of the under-identification LM test 
by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and 
Paap, which must be relatively high (higher than 10 as a rule of thumb) to reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value higher than 
0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.   
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Table 5 
Optimal bank credit risk: Risk measured by delinquent loans 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROE 
ROA t-1 0.932*** 0.911***  
 (7.312) (7.505)  
ROE t-1   0.993*** 
   (7.793) 
Deliquent loans t-1 0.224* 0.238* 2.609** 
 (1.806) (1.715) (2.019) 
Deliquent loans
2 
t-1 -6.769* -7.125*   -90.303** 
 (-1.850) (-1.755)   (-2.008)   
Risk-weighted assets
 
t-1 -0.060** -0.059** -0.385 
 (-2.243) (-2.358) (-1.592) 
Bank size t-1 0.011 0.007 0.082 
 (0.929) (0.636) (0.748)   
Capital t-1 0.207** 0.183** 2.052** 
 (2.563) (2.302) (2.474) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.047 -0.042 -0.336 
 (-0.965) (-0.959) (-0.715) 
Non-interest income t-1 -0.004 0.003   -0.250 
 (-0.065) (0.063) (-0.618) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.342 -0.315 -3.089 
 (-1.590) (-1.607) (-1.391) 
Provisions t-1 -1.076   -0.811 -3.118   
 (-0.908) (-0.736) (-0.269)   
Commercial loans t-1  0.005 0.011 
  (0.735) (0.137) 
Loans to individuals t-1  -0.018 0.014 
  (-0.459) (0.037)    
Loans to real estate t-1  0.000  0.002 
  (0.160) (0.214)   
Optimal point 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
Observations 170,973 170,973 170,973 
OIT (p-value) 0.632 0.547 0.635 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (7). Risk is measured by the delinquent-
loans ratio. All variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated 
with the Arellano and Bond (1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels 
and robust standard errors. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Optimal bank credit risk: Other sensitivity analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.378*** 0.252**  0.489*** 0.507*** 
 (3.295) (2.209)  (47.470) (46.743) 
Risk-weighted assetst-1 2.523*** 0.870*** 0.068***   
 (7.406) (2.586) (14.197)   
Risk-weighted assets
2
t-1 -1.837*** -0.610*** -0.047***   
 (-7.423) (-2.755) (-13.557)   
Risk-weighted assets t-4     0.011*** 
     (4.256) 
Risk-weighted assets
2 
t-4     -0.009*** 
     (-4.347) 
Σ(Risk-weighted assets t-
1…t-3) 
   0.036***  
    (10.288)  
Σ(Risk-weighted assets2 
t-1…t-3) 
   -0.026***  
    (-10.230)  
Bank size t-1 -0.002*** -0.008** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000   
 (-3.117) (-2.087) (17.571) (11.061) (1.448) 
Capital t-1 -0.001 0.024 -0.031*** -0.004** -0.007*** 
 (-0.051) (0.785) (-16.059)   (-2.390) (-8.561) 
Liquidity t-1 0.069*** 0.045 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (5.652) (1.469) (-5.526) (-5.547) (-1.499) 
Non-interest income t-1 0.004 0.048* 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (0.302) (1.886) (15.578) (12.829) (4.708) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.073* -0.108 -0.120*** -0.069*** -0.043*** 
 (-1.841) (-1.388) (-32.148) (-27.390) (-17.579) 
Provisions t-1 0.292*** 0.511 -0.040*** -0.012 0.002 
 (2.722) (1.549) (-2.819) (-1.468) (0.380) 
Optimal point 0.686*** 0.713*** 0.721*** 0.687*** 0.668***   
Observations 118,996 37,613 557,179 524,389 511,173 
R-square (overall)   0.172 0.372 0.356 
OIT (p-value) 0.485 0.601    
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of 
variants of equation (7). Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated with the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors. Regressions (3) 
to (5) are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors.   In 
regression (1) all variables are annual averages of quarterly observations and include annual 
fixed effects. In regression (2) all variables are bi-annual averages of quarterly observations 
and include bi-annual fixed effects. Regression (3) does not have a lagged dependent variable.  
Regressions (4) and (5) consider alternative lag structures. Regressions (3)-(5) include quarter 
fixed effects. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % 
level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Optimal bank credit risk: Specific bank groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.558*** 0.480*** 0.483*** 0.494*** 
 (20.031) (36.105) (23.219)   (57.114) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.026   0.038*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 
 (1.494) (9.249) (8.238)   (4.215) 
Risk-weighted assets
2 
t-1 -0.020 -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.015*** 
 (-1.597) (-8.947) (-8.088) (-4.036) 
Bank size t-1 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*   
 (1.254) (10.589) (7.659)     (1.714) 
Capital t-1   0.009   -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.002 
 (1.215) (-11.176) (-4.901) (-0.894) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.004** -0.002***    -0.002** -0.005*** 
 (-2.054)   (-3.683) (-2.459) (-5.415)   
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 
 (4.193) (7.196)   (7.207) (8.533) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.060*** -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.066*** 
    (-6.195) (-22.872) (-11.863) (-18.716) 
Provisions t-1 -0.001 0.012 0.027** -0.119*** 
 (-0.038)    (1.190) (2.262) (-12.579) 
Constant -0.010 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.004** 
 (-1.639) (-10.637) (-6.810) (-2.147) 
Optimal point 0.640*** 0.714*** 0.710*** 0.680*** 
Observations 55,345 279,334 139,143 138,854 
R-square (overall) 0.441 0.375 0.352 0.461 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors and include quarter fixed effects. Regression (1) is based on a 
subsample of banks that have total assets above the 90% percentile.  Regression 
(2) is based on a subsample of banks that have total assets below the 50% 
percentile. Regression (3) is based on a subsample of banks that have a total risk-
based capital ratio above the 75% percentile. Regression (4) is based on a 
subsample of banks that have a total risk-based capital ratio below the 25% 
percentile. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Percentiles for the sample splitting variables of Table 7.  
Variable/Percentiles 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
Total Assets 21,245.725 29,813.602 54,624.621 113,857.16 263,845.77 656,849.37 1,237,445.8 
Risk-Based Capital Ratio 0.111 0.116 0.129 0.153 0.197 0.263 0.326 
Notes: The table contains percentiles of per bank, across time, averages of total assets and risk-based capital ratios. Total assets are 
in thousands of dollars. 
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Table 9 
Optimal bank credit risk: Time-varying models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROA 
ROA t-1 0.511***  0.106*** 
 (51.009)  (2.597) 
ROE t-1  0.524***  
  (79.098)  
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.002*** 0.003  
 (3.565) (0.637)  
Risk-weighted assets
2
 t-1 -0.016*** -0.132***  
 (-4.482) (-5.374)  
Delinquent loanst-1     41.416*** 
   (4.921)   
Delinquent loans
2
t-1   267.396*** 
   (3.637) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1   -0.004 
   (-0.453) 
Bank size t-1 0.001*** 0.005*** -0.017** 
 (11.915) (6.880)   (-2.118) 
Capital t-1 -0.012*** -0.097*** 0.024 
 (-10.853) (-16.261) (1.108) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.002*** -0.027*** 0.013 
 (-5.874) (-7.841) (0.992) 
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.063*** -0.103*** 
 (12.368) (12.576) (-5.938) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.068*** -0.890*** -0.100** 
 (-28.224) (-28.082) (-2.406) 
Provisions t-1 -0.001 -0.305*** 0.332*** 
 (-0.115) (-5.027) (3.477) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.020***  
 (30.818) (29.218)  
Observations 557,179 557,179 184,059 
R-square (overall) 0.407 0.385  
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (8). All variables are defined in Table 1. In 
regressions (1) and (2) estimation method is OLS on the fixed effects model with 
robust standard errors. Regression (3) is estimated with the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors.  All 
regressions include quarter fixed effects. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Time-varying models: Specific bank groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.555*** 0.511*** 0.494*** 0.496*** 
 (21.212) (51.009) (24.034) (57.475) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.002 0.002*** 0.002 0.002** 
 (1.028) (3.565)   (1.562) (2.133) 
Risk-weighted assets
2 
t-1 -0.006 -0.016*** -0.012* -0.013* 
 (-0.581) (-4.482) (-1.881) (-1.920) 
Bank size t-1 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 
 (1.201) (11.915) (7.757) (1.582) 
Capital t-1 0.010   -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.002    
 (1.579)   (-10.853) (-4.680) (-0.865) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.004** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.288) (-5.874)   (-3.162)   (-5.455)   
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 
 (4.146) (12.368) (7.368)  (8.593) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.066*** 
 (-6.024) (-28.224) (-12.043) (-18.807) 
Provisions t-1 -0.002 -0.001 0.026** -0.118*** 
 (-0.075) (-0.115) (2.187) (-12.509) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (6.166) (30.818) (19.027) (12.525) 
Observations 55,345 557,179 139,143 138,854 
R-square (overall) 0.451 0.407 0.380 0.466 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (8). All variables are defined in Table 1.  All 
regressions are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors and include quarter fixed effects. Regression (1) is based on a 
subsample of banks that have total assets above the 90% percentile.  Regression 
(2) is based on a subsample of banks that have total assets below the 50% 
percentile. Regression (3) is based on a subsample of banks that have a total risk-
based capital ratio above the 75% percentile. Regression (4) is based on a 
subsample of banks that have a total risk-based capital ratio below the 25% 
percentile. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
50 
 
 
 
 
Table 11  
Unit root tests 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller GLS Dickey-Fuller 
 Coefficient 5% critical value Coefficient 5% Critical Value 
Output (2) -2.063  -2.921 0.828  -2.210 
Federal funds rate (2) -2.166 -2.921 -1.711 -2.210 
Realized risk (6) -1.612 -2.924 -1.245 -2.112 
Optimal risk (2) -1.766 -2.922 -1.269 -2.215 
Notes: The table reports the augmented and GLS Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, along with their 5% 
critical values. The number of lags for each series is determined by information criteria and is in 
the parenthesis next to the variable. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12  
Cointegration vector 
 Output Federal funds rate Realized risk Optimal risk 
Coefficient 1.000 0.352 15.982 -22.819 
Standard deviation 0.000 0.061 5.470 4.776 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Notes: The table reports the cointegration vector given by equation (11) of the VECM given by equation (10). 
The VECM is estimated using the one stage approach of Johansen (1995). The sample spans the period 1997Q3 
to 2011Q4. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk of failed banks 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk based on delinquent loans 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of large banks (total assets>90% of sample average) 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of small banks (total assets<50% of sample average) 
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of well-capitalized banks (capital>75% of sample 
average) 
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Figure 7 
Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of poorly-capitalized banks (capital<25% of sample average) 
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Figure 8 
Stability of the time-series model 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The upper part of the figure shows the recursively estimated largest eigenvalue (solid line), and its 
confidence interval (dashed lines), based on sample moments from an increasing fraction of the sample. The 
lower part of the figure shows that the recursive Tau statistics (solid line) never crosses the 95% critical value 
(dashed line) and, therefore, the null hypothesis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected. 
                     
55 
 
Figure 9 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a shock in optimal risk-weighted assets 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
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Figure 11 
Impulse response of optimal risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
 
 
 
 
